Moldovan president's statements following Supreme Security Council's meeting from July 30, 2025

At the meeting of the Supreme Security Council (CSS) today, we discussed measures to combat information manipulation and foreign interference with the   electoral processes. There is important information about the risks to our country's security and the democratic processes in Moldova. It's important that these risks are brought to the citizens' attention.

The Russian Federation aims to control Moldova as of next autumn and is preparing for an unprecedented interference in the September elections. The risks to public order and national security are significant, and all institutions, as well as society need to be aware of the danger and protect ourselves from it.

The Kremlin is investing in multiple political vehicles, in order to insert its people into the next parliament, aiming to gain control over the power in Moldova:

1) The so-called sovereigntist movement, which has nothing to do with our country's sovereignty, and the mission of which is promoting the alternative development of Moldova by subordinating Moldova's interests to the ones of the Russian Federation, as well as promoting Euroscepticism.

2) The aggressive and populist movement, directly orchestrated by the Shor crime ring. Especially through destabilization activities and building networks for vote-buying. These forces are set to recruit violent people for protests. Planned actions involve engaging other organized crime rings and committing acts of vandalism against state institutions.

3) Political projects targeting the moderate pro-European electorate and “false flag” projects. The Russian Federation is also behind independent candidates who are not directly controlled, but indirectly supported, in order to fill the informational space with “equidistant” criticisms of the state and electoral competitors.

All these political projects are coordinated from the same command point and are set to receive funding and propaganda support from Moscow, largely through corruption schemes organized by the Shor group.

Analyses by institutions show 10 main tools of interference with Moldova's political and electoral processes:

1. Electoral corruption and illicit external funding represent the main threat at the September 28 elections – including through cryptocurrencies, “courier” networks, and money laundering schemes aimed at corrupting the electoral process (transfers to those with accounts in Promsviazbank, later leveraged through conversion schemes, illicit financing of electoral campaigns, financing disinformation and destabilization operations, corrupting people within the legal system). Funding through cryptocurrencies is planned to the sum of about 100 million euros. Money laundering and distribution networks. Micro-crediting is used here for hidden funding. Dear citizens, this is a serious problem that can personally affect you. We know that there are microcredits opened on the names of thousands of Moldovan citizens in Russian banks, contracted in their absence. You may find yourself in debt to Russian banks without knowing it. Do not provide your data to these groups which only use you.

• Vote selling is a serious crime - those who sell their vote risk a fine of between 25,000 and 37,500 lei. Approximately 25,000 fines have already been imposed and nearly 15 million lei have been collected. If the crime is committed in the interest of a criminal organization, the sentence is 8 to 15 years' imprisonment.

• Sanctioning those who organize vote-buying - electoral corruption is punished with imprisonment from 2 to 6 years, a fine between 37,500 lei and 57,500 lei, and deprivation of the right to hold certain positions. Please be very careful, do not give personal information to these criminal groups and do not let yourself be manipulated or used. If the crime is committed in the interest of a criminal organization - the punishment is 8 to 15 years' imprisonment. Police and prosecutors have already opened 62 criminal files in 2025.

2. Foreign informational manipulation campaigns. The informational space will continue to be one of the primary dimensions of influence, managed both by Russian secret services and by RM actors connected to Moscow. Lies, letters, calls, messages, acts - all false - will daily intoxicate our informational space (ex: emails sent to our citizens abroad in the name of state institutions, such as the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) urging voting for a certain party; accusations of pre-election fraud; deepfake clips with Moldovan officials; anti-EU messages, messages about “imminent famine” or “war”).  Denigration campaigns and personal attacks – pro-European leaders, journalists and known personalities are denigrated. These campaigns are made through fabricated content, insults and aggressive visual editing. Promoting messages as if from me or other officials, urging people to invest in certain projects, banks or financial schemes. All these messages are false. Please be vigilant, do not believe them and do not allocate money to such schemes.  All this aim to enhance the level of stress in society and people's distrust in the state Republic of Moldova. Falsehoods are promoted both in the local and international informational environment. You have probably already read in the press about campaigns launched by the Russian Federation targeting, for instance, even me in the international press, which is not authentic press, but fabricated pages claiming to be international publications. Most of this false content is generated by Artificial Intelligence and promoted through AI.

• The Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation should publicly communicate the propaganda's attack lines. All state institutions must respond immediately to falsehoods and quickly, clearly, and transparently inform the society.

• Each of us can stop a falsehood - by not distributing it, by informing people about lies, by paying increased attention to what we read, believe and share with others. Here, only our own discernment can save us.

3. Organizing paid protests – artificial protests in exchange for financial rewards, aimed at exhausting and disorienting, creating the false perception of widespread dissatisfaction in society, destabilizing public order, and putting immense pressure on state institutions (ex: 2023 protests, where participants were paid in cash; organized transport; mobilizations via WhatsApp and Telegram with centralized logistical coordination in Chisinau, Comrat). Police have already warned about paid protests in 2025, and following legislative changes this year, financial remuneration for participation in protest is punished as a contravention.

4. Cyberattacks on the digital infrastructure ensuring the conduct of elections and on other critical infrastructure objectives (entities providing essential services to citizens). Goals: blocking and unavailability of electoral infrastructure, state institutions' web pages. Phishing attacks on governmental infrastructure, in order to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data. Creating false platforms or cloning official resources.

5. Using the church for a foreign state's purposes and instrumentalizing religion – to instill fear and radicalize different population categories (ex: organizing pilgrimages to Russia where individuals are instructed on how to organize such activities, media and logistical support by Russia-affiliated groups; actions of the “Eurasia” foundation registered by Shor’s team, with indirect external support, possibly Federal Security Service (FSB)). Here, I'd like to remind priests that selling out your neighbor, selling your country is a great sin.

6. Using online communication platforms. First and foremost, Telegram. Mobilization for protests is organized on Telegram in closed groups, distribution of information about rewards for participating in protests, and especially organizing voter corruption schemes. This happened last year and is happening this year too. Telegram promotes messages trying to normalize vote-buying processes. Unfortunately, there is no communication with Telegram, or rather no response when state institutions signal falsehoods or voter corruption actions happening on this platform. Other platforms are certainly used as well: TikTok, Facebook and Instagram. On TikTok, we notice the creation of thousands of accounts to amplify anti-EU and anti-governmental messages. With TikTok, there is some communication, and we will see if there will be collaboration regarding these fake accounts violating the law. Similarly, on Facebook and Instagram, we see disinformation, emotional manipulation and attempts to create anxiety and fear in society.

7. Involvement of organized crime in destabilization actions involves engaging representatives of the underworld in organizing destabilization actions in penitentiary institutions and outside them. Involvement of high-risk  communities of sportspeople. Actions coordinated by certain leaders of organized crime rings, like Caramalac and Pruteanu.

8. Sabotaging the electoral process in the Diaspora: actions to compromise/reduce citizens' participation in voting (sabotage actions or provocations in the polling station’s areas, obstructing the activity of polling stations, monitoring by false observers, attempts to corrupt voters, narratives dividing society about who has the right to decide the country's fate and who doesn't).

9. Hybrid influences on the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (UTAG) and the left of the Nistru electorate:

o Transnistrian region: trainings of groups affiliated with the Shor group, actions by actors there favoring certain political forces, actions of corrupting voters in the region, organized mobilization and transportation, use of online platforms to distribute falsehoods. Also, provocations in the Security Zone are possible, demonstrations of force, energy crises on the eve of election day.

o actions to radicalize the Chisinau-Comrat relationship, organizing protests, corrupting voters, false narratives about threats to autonomy. All these are promoted with the support of the Russian Federation.

10. Online mobilization and radicalization – developing digital cells promoting extremism and inciting hatred and civil disobedience. Even for these actions, influencers paid by the Kremlin are and will be used.

The purpose of these actions is to increase social tensions, weaken people's trust in the state and generate violence. The greatest danger of Russia's interference with our internal affairs is that it poses a direct threat to national security, sovereignty, and the European future of our country.

Institutions must collaborate much more closely in the coming period for data exchange, identifying and stopping attempts to circumvent the law, creating institutional mechanisms for dissemination of information in the context of increasingly heightened information manipulation, and acting in a united, professional way to protect national interest.

Dear citizens, a complicated period awaits us. We will face well-prepared external interferences, with immense financial resources and criminal groups involved. This should not frighten us, but mobilize us. Our institutions have an important duty, and they know what they have to do. But citizens also have a great responsibility – what information we consume, what actions we take, what we believe and how we make decisions – Moldova's future literally depends on all this. And all of us, who are connected to Moldova and love Moldova, want a future in the European Union, in peace and development.